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The ‘‘experiences’’ reported by individuals affected by
schizophrenia are fundamental components of the descrip-
tive approach adopted by current diagnostic systems for
mental disorders and by clinical diagnostic interviews and
rating scales for the assessment of the symptoms of schizo-
phrenia. However, the technical literature does not rely on
a speciﬁc deﬁnition of experiences in schizophrenia. This ar-
ticle introduces a speciﬁc, restrictive, operationalized deﬁni-
tionofthe‘‘experiential substrate’’ofschizophrenia, deﬁned
by the ‘‘self-giving’’ ‘‘passive experiences’’ of the disorder
that break into the consciousness of the affected individual,
andaredistinguishedfromthe‘‘active’’actsofjudgmentfor-
mulation and conviction/belief attainment. The experiential
substrate of schizophrenia may be considered similar to the
experiential substrate of pain. The operationalization of the
deﬁnition of passive experiences can enable the experiential
substrate of schizophrenia to be acknowledged as an inde-
pendent domain with a speciﬁc role in the assessment of
the disorder, a role that is substantially omitted or ignored
by current research and practice. The term ‘‘descriptive
micropsychopathology’’ is proposed for this new method
aimed to describe passive experiences and active judgments
as independent domains to enhance the reformulation of cri-
teria for symptom assessment and, consequently, reformula-
tion of the criteria for the assessment of the efﬁcacy and
effectiveness of interventions aimed at prevention, care,
and rehabilitation in schizophrenia. A new measure focusing
on the evaluation of the passive experiences of schizophrenia
and on the disturbance they cause to patients is also
described.
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Introduction
This article introduces and defines the domain of the ‘‘ex-
periential substrate’’ and the ‘‘passive experiences’’ of
schizophrenia. Passive experiences are subjective experi-
ences characterized by passive reception of the experi-
ence. The term ‘‘passive,’’ used in reference to the
experiences of a disorder, shares the same basic etymol-
ogyof the term ‘‘patient,’’ and the passive experiences are
similar to the simple and immediate experiences of pain
described in medicine: an individual may feel, suffer, and
undergothe experiential substrate of schizophrenia in the
same way that other individuals feel, suffer, and undergo
the experiential substrate of physical pain. Therefore,
other meanings of the term experience (ie, the action
of putting to the test, trial, experiment, to make experi-
ment of, to test, to try) are excluded from the experiential
substrate, passive experiences, and ‘‘passive domain’’ of
schizophrenia because they do not imply the passive na-
ture of this psychopathology domain.
The passive experiences of schizophrenia are here con-
sidered a fundamental, independent domain with a pre-
cise role in descriptive psychopathology. Passive
experiences and active judgments, in particular those
judgments formulated in terms of ‘‘conviction’’ or
‘‘doubt’’ about the passive experiences themselves, are
distinct domains that need to be analyzed independently.
The term ‘‘descriptive micropsychopathology’’ is pro-
posed to describe these independent domains and the ar-
chitecture of their possible interactions. This article is
particularly focused on the definition of passive experien-
ces due to their being currently neglected, omitted, or ig-
nored as an independent domain and their being
intermingled and confused with acts of judgment in cur-
rent descriptive psychopathology.
The introduction and definition of the domain of the
experiential substrate and the passive experiences of
schizophrenia are divided into 3 main sections. The first
section starts with key definitions of experiences, symp-
toms, and the descriptive approach in psychopathology.
This general framework is followed by the new opera-
tional definition of passive experiences. This new defini-
tion is then applied in an analysis of ‘‘thought insertion’’
and Jaspers’ ‘‘delusion proper’’ and discussed in relation
to the relevant historical and current approaches in de-
scriptive psychopathology. The second section of the
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1183article analyzes a number of semistructured and struc-
tured clinical interviews to clarify how this new descrip-
tive approach applies in practice and how these measures
conflate what has been defined here as passive experien-
ces with other phenomena. Finally, the third section dis-
cusses some practical issues related to the passive
experiences of schizophrenia for the assessment of effi-
cacy, effectiveness and subjective usefulness of treat-
ments, and the implications for adherence to treatment
in research and practice.
ExperiencesandDescriptiveApproachinPsychopathology
Readers of this article are likely to be familiar with cur-
rent diagnostic tools and outcome measures. However,
they might be less familiar with historical nosology, def-
initions of psychopathology concepts (Phillips),
1 or phe-
nomenology (Andreasen
2).
The descriptive approach in psychopathology was
conceptualized by Jaspers
3 at the beginning of the
20th century. Jaspers
3 emphasized the importance of
the descriptions of the patients’ experiences,
a domain of psychopathology which he named
‘‘phenomenology’’:
Phenomenology is the study which describes patients’ sub-
jectiveexperiencesandeverythingelsethatexistsorcomesto
be within the field of their awareness. These subjective data
of experience are in contrast with other objective phenom-
ena, obtained by methods of performance-testing, observa-
tion of somatic state or assessment of what the patients’
expressions, actions and various productions may mean
(p53). .An experience is better described by the person
who has undergone it . The patients themselves are the
observersandwecanonlytesttheircredibilityandjudgment
.... Psychotic self-descriptions are not only unique but yield
reliable results and through them we have discovered many
of our basic concepts. If we compare what patients say we
find much that is similar (p55).
Jaspers’ concepts focusing on the ‘‘description’’ of the
patients’ experiences influenced mainstream psychopa-
thologyintheareasofclinicalinterviews,symptomassess-
ment, and diagnostic formulation during subsequent
decades. In particular, Schneider
4 wrote:
Our psychopathology uses the methods of descriptive anal-
ysis (pXV). . the methods of clinical interview from the
standpoint of psychopathology were established decades
ago by Karl Jaspers.(p94). We have emphasized abnormal
experiences and abnormal expression as diagnostically sig-
nificant symptoms . (p132).
Similarly, in the 1970s, Wing et al
5 noted:
. In psychiatric practice there is often nothing else to go on
but the patient’s own description of his experiences (p4).
and these views were subsequently reflected in Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition
(DSM-III), and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV).
6
Work began on DSM-III in 1974 with publication in 1980.
DSM-IIIintroduceda number ofimportantmethodological
innovations, including . a descriptive approach that
attempted to be neutral with respect to theories of etiology
(pXXVI).
The word ‘‘phenomenon’’ (Andreasen
7)
. is now roughly equivalent to reported or observed expe-
riences of patients (or signs and symptoms in psychopathol-
ogy) .. This type of study focuses on human experience at
afinegradedanddetailedlevelanddoesnotmakeinferences
about specific disease states ..
Experiences and Symptoms in Psychiatry and Medicine
In spite of the universal use and abuse of the term ‘‘expe-
riences,’’ a specific, technical, operationalized definition
of experiences has not been yet formulated and the term
experiences is systematically omitted from psychiatric
glossaries. As a result, psychiatry lacks a clear definition
of the domain of the experiential substrate of psychiatric
disorders and consequently of the relationships between
experiential substrate, symptom, and sign in psychiatry
and medicine. Jaspers
3 emphasized that the key feature
of ‘‘symptom’’ and ‘‘sign’’ (the 2 terms share the same
basic meaning of ‘‘indicator’’) is to recognize an under-
lying event, in its causal aspect, which we cannot perceive
directly:
The extra-conscious element which we cannot perceive di-
rectly is recognized by a sign or symptom. All the phenom-
ena of psychic and somatic life are conceivable as signs or
symptoms, when we consider the underlying event in its
causal aspect. If the extra-conscious element is a known
physical process, the psychic phenomena are then signs or
symptoms of this process . (pp459–460).
This concept is further elaborated by Schneider
4:
What does a symptom mean? In medicine we take it to mean
the sign of an illness, an understandable indication of an ill-
ness. Experience teaches that this or that sign occurs with
this or that illness, and through experience we learn that
if we heed certain signs, we can conclude the presence of
a certain illness. . What meaning can ‘‘symptom’’ have
with these ‘‘endogenous psychoses’’, ie those that have no
demonstrable somatic base. Still thinking in medical terms
wemaysaythattheonsetofdelusion,forexample,isasymp-
tomofanillness,undemonstrable,itis truebutitcan atleast
be postulated. It would be wiser, however, in this case to un-
derstand by ‘‘symptom’’ some generally characteristic, con-
stant feature of a purely psychopathological nature that can
bestructured intoanexisting statewitha subsequentcourse.
In this case the medical connotation of symptom is aban-
doned. A psychopathological structure consisting of
a ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘course’’ is not an illness which can produce
symptoms. Thought withdrawal, for instance, is at bottom,
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conceived state of schizophrenia, but it is a factor fre-
quently found and therefore a prominent feature of it ..
If we find thought-withdrawal in a psychosis of not known
somatic base, there is only an agreed convention that I
then call this psychosis a schizophrenia. It seems well
worthwhile preserving this particular meaning of ‘‘symp-
tom’’. We are in a sphere of endogenous, not demonstrably
somatic, psychoses, which at present are only psychopath-
ologically established. The ‘‘token sign’’ or characteristic
feature is, therefore, still a clinical concept, referring to
a psychopathologically constructed ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘course’’
(pp130-132).
The objective/subjective distinction is reported by Jas-
pers
8 to refer simply to the modality in which the symp-
toms are evaluated
‘‘Objective symptoms’’ include all concrete events that can
be perceived by the senses, e.g. reflexes, registrable move-
ments, and individual physiognomy, his motor activity,
verbal expression, written productions, actions and gen-
eral conduct, etc.; . It is also usual to include under ob-
jective symptoms such features as delusional ideas,
falsification of memory, in other words the rational con-
tents of what the patient tells us .. Subjective symptoms
. are all those psychic experiences and phenomena which
patientsdescribetousandwhichonlybecomeaccessibleto
us at second hand through the patient’s own judgment and
presentation ..’’
and ‘‘objective symptoms’’ are not assigned a special
value as indicators of the underlying event which we can-
not perceive directly.
The current definition of symptom in Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition,
Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR)
6:
a subjective manifestation of a pathological condition.
Symptoms are reported by the affected individual rather
than observed by the examiner (p828).
and the definition of sign
6:
anobjectivemanifestationofapathologicalcondition.Signs
are observed by the examiner rather than reported by the
affected individual (p827).
underlines the differentiation between symptom, defined
as a subjective manifestation of the ‘‘pathological condi-
tion’’becauseitisreportedbytheaffectedindividual, and
sign, defined an objective manifestation because it is ob-
served by the examiner.
The relevance given to the source of clinical informa-
tion (subjective or objective collection) in the symptom/
sign categorization in comparison with the key feature of
their possible value as indicators has been criticized in
medicine
9 and is particularly fragile in psychiatry and
schizophrenia.
This articleintroducesand definesthe experientialsub-
strate and the passive experiences of schizophrenia, a do-
main that is to be considered ‘‘subjective’’ and a possible
indicator of what, according to Schneider,
4 ‘‘only an
agreed convention names schizophrenia.’’ Passive experi-
ences can be considered conceptually similar to the char-
acteristic subjective experience of pain radiation in
myocardial infarction. If the somatic base of myocardial
infarction was unknown, the characteristic subjective
(passive) experience of pain radiation would be consid-
ered an indicator of what only an agreed convention
would name myocardial infarction.
In this context, among possible indicators, the descrip-
tive psychopathology of schizophrenia should in partic-
ular differentiate
(i) passive experiences directly described by the subject
(only the subject is able to ‘‘observe’’ them), whose
evaluation by the clinician relies simply on the mere
transcription of the description of the experiential
substrateofthedisordergivenbythesubject(ie,pas-
sive experiences in the various domains, of thought,
perception, emotion, etc.);
(ii) subject’s judgment (incidentally, the term ‘‘judg-
ment’’ is currently neglected by psychiatric glossa-
ries) observed by the clinician, whose evaluation
relies on the clinical evaluation of the subject’s active
and intentional process of judgment formulation, ei-
ther onhis/her ownpassive experiences or not, either
in terms of doubt or belief/conviction, either delu-
sional or not (ie, delusional judgments); and
(iii) behavioral symptoms observed by the clinician,
whose evaluation does neither rely on any subject’s
mere self-observation and description of the experi-
ential substrate nor on the subject’s judgment
(ie, pressure of speech, affective blunting, movement
disorder).
The passive experiences, that only the patient is able
to observe, can be transcribed and collected indepen-
dently and may be valuable symptoms and indicator
of schizophrenia in themselves. Similarly to the assess-
ment of pain, where the subjective experience of pain
and pain behavior are independently assessed, the pas-
sive experience (ie, of hallucination) needs to be
assessed separately from the related judgment or behav-
ior (ie, ‘‘hallucinatory behavior’’) and not collapsed
with them.
This article focuses on the first type of possible indi-
cators: the experiential substrate and passive experien-
ces of schizophrenia as a specific, independent domain.
Judgment and behaviors are examined only to clarify
the boundaries of the passive experiences and to high-
light their different nature. In particular, the distinc-
tion between the passive experiences of the disorder
and the judgment formulated by the patient toward
the passive experiences themselves, aimed to under-
stand or explain the passive experiences, will be care-
fully examined.
1185
Passive and Active SchizophreniaDeﬁnition of the Passive Experiences
The following explicit, restrictive use of the term pas-
sive experiences in schizophrenia is formulated. Pas-
sive experiences (hypothesized to represent the
experiential substrate of the disorder) are defined as
follows:
(i) Passively and involuntarily received, simple, imme-
diate, self-giving.
(ii) Nonoptional, unavoidable, self-evident.
(iii) Easily recognized and acknowledged by patients,
whoareabletodescribeandrecognize/acknowledge
the individual passive experiences if adequately
questioned.
(iv) Experienced in various areas (eg, thought, percep-
tion, emotion).
(v) Potential indicators of schizophrenia.
(vi) Frequently experienced as enigmatic and puzzling.
(vii) Frequently experienced as disturbing.
This restrictive definition of the passive experiences
excludes the subject’s
(i) Active and intentional ‘‘position taking’’ toward
each passive experience;
(ii) Actively and intentionally formulated judgments,
ideas, notions, convictions, and beliefs;
(iii) Acts of judgment formulation aimed to understand/
explain each passive experience in terms of doubt/
belief,noconviction/conviction,uncertainty/certainty;
and
(iv) Acts of judgment formulation aimed at understand-
ing or explaining the passive experience in terms of
its relationship to a codified and/or operationalized
symptom or diagnosis of schizophrenia (‘‘awareness
of illness’’ or ‘‘insight’’).
The terms passive experiences, passive domain, and ex-
periential substrate should not be confused with terms
like ‘‘passivity phenomena’’ or with the ‘‘positive’’ and
‘‘negative’’ domains. The passive experiences, passive do-
main, and experiential substrate are intended to refer to
the general schizophrenic condition.
Thought Insertion, Jaspers’ Delusion Proper, and Passive
Experiences
To clarify how this new definition applies, 2 core con-
cepts in the psychopathology of schizophrenia will be
analyzed due to their controversial categorization:
thought insertion (Mullins and Speance
10) and Jaspers’
delusion proper (Spitzer et al,
11 Jones et al,
12 and
Owen et al
13). They provide a useful opportunity to ex-
amine how this new approach may contribute to their
reformulation.
Thought Insertion
Jaspers
3 included thought insertion in the domain of
‘‘awareness of self.’’ He described how thought phenom-
enadifferfromthe‘‘normal,’’‘‘familiar’’processofthinking.
Wetakeitforgrantedthatwhenwethink,itiswewhothink,
a thought is our thought and the notions that strike us—and
perhaps make us say not ‘I think’ but ‘It occurs to me’—are
still at the same time our thoughts, executed by us .. The
thought phenomena of schizophrenics is something quite
different in that they talk about ‘thoughts made by others’
(passivity thinking) and ‘thought withdrawal’, using words
coined by themselves, which psychopathology has had to
take over . The patient does not know why he has this
thought nor did he intend to have it . (p122)
This approach did not change substantially in
Schneider
4:
Among the many abnormal modes of experience that occur
in schizophrenics, there are some which we put in the first
rank of importance (p133) . the group of symptoms which
constitute ‘‘loss of identity’’(ego disturbance): Thought-
withdrawal, passivity thinking, diffusion of thought, and
all passivity experiences whether feeling, drive or volition,
may be involved . (p134).
nor in the Present State Examination (PSE)
5 which con-
sidered this phenomenon an‘‘experience’’ and not a delu-
sion itself:
The essence of this symptom is that the subject experiences
thoughts which are not his own intruding into his mind
(p160).
The PSE
5 instructions for rating thought insertion are
Include only thoughts recognized as alien. Do not include
delusional elaboration, only basic experience (p207).
DSM-IV phenomenon of thought insertion was in-
cluded as a specific example of the symptom ‘‘delusions’’
and considered a ‘‘bizarre delusion’’
6:
Delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausi-
ble and not understandable and do not derive from ordi-
nary life experiences . delusions that express a loss of
control over mind and body are generally to be considered
bizarre, these include a person’s belief that his or her
thoughts have been taken away by some outside
force (‘‘thought withdrawal’’), that alien thoughts have
been put into his or her mind ‘‘thought insertion’’ . If
the delusions are considered to be bizarre only this single
symptomisneededtosatisfyCriterionAforschizophrenia
(p299).
The DSM-IV thought insertion and thought with-
drawal may be considered only homonymous of the
‘‘original’’ Schneider’s first rank symptoms: Schneider
considered them abnormal modes of experience, while
DSM-IV intermingled and conflated them with
delusions.
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Delusion proper (defined also as ‘‘primary, final, irreduc-
ible delusion,’’ and ‘‘delusional experience’’) was a con-
cept developed by Jaspers
3 to distinguish 2 large groups
of delusions according to their origin:
We can then distinguish two large groups of delusion
accordingtotheirorigin:onegroupemergesunderstandably
from preceding affects, from shattering, mortifying, guilt
provoking or other such experiences, from false perception
or from the experience of derealization in states of altered
consciousness, etc. The other group is for us psychologically
irreducible; phenomenologically it is something final. We
give the term delusion-like ideas to the first group; the latter
we term ‘‘delusion proper’’(p96).
Delusion proper, defined by Jaspers
3 phenomenologi-
cally as a final experience that is psychologically irreduc-
ible, has 2 other main characteristics: It is ‘‘beyond our
understanding’’ and it is characterized by the ‘‘intrusive
knowledge of the meaning.’’
If we try to get some new understanding of these primary
experiences of delusion we soon find we cannot really appre-
ciate these quite alien modes of experience. They remain
largely incomprehensible, unreal and beyond our under-
standing (Jaspers, p98) .. Everything gets a new meaning
. the environment offers a world of new meanings. All
thinking is thinking about meanings . There is an immedi-
ate intrusive knowledge of the meaning and it is this which is
itself the delusional experience (wahn-erleben). If we distin-
guish the different sense-data in which meaning of this sort
can be experienced, we can speak of delusional perception,
delusional ideas, delusional memories, delusional aware-
ness, etc.) (p99). [In Schneider,
4 the criterion of something
primary, psychologically irreducible is not adopted (p114)
in his definition of delusional perception (p104) and delu-
sional notion (p107). Note of the Author]
DSM-IV invoked Jaspers to characterize bizarre delu-
sions
14:
. bizarre delusions . would be implausible. The definition
represented an effort to invoke Jaspersian concepts of ‘‘non-
understandibility’’(DSM-IV Sourcebook, Vol 1, p345).
Three alternative definitions formulated to improve
(unsuccessfully) the reliability of bizarre delusions
(Spitzer et al
11) included the ununderstandability of
Jaspers’ delusion proper:
.‘‘delusionsproper’’whicharebytheirnature‘‘psycholog-
ically irreducible,’’ that is un-understandable. . While ‘‘de-
lusion-like ideas’’ occur in many psychopathological states,
according to Jaspers, ‘‘delusions proper’’ are relatively spe-
cific of schizophrenia .
An example of a delusion that was rated as ‘‘bizarre’’
according to each of the 3 formulations (the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edi-
tion, Revised, definition ‘‘involving a phenomenon that
the person’s culture would regard as totally implausible,’’
a definition that involves ‘‘beliefs that violate virtually all
subcultures’ understanding of the natural and physical
world,’’ and finally a definition ‘‘that involves thought
processes that are so divorced from normal human expe-
rience that the delusions are ununderstandable’’) is
reported below
11:
A 41-year-oldwomanhadthedelusionthatafamousauthor
had obtained a machine that she was using in an attempt to
cure the patient of her emotional problems. This machine
was able to read her thoughts and to insert thoughts and
feelings into her mind. The writer has failed in her attempt
to cure the patient, who now intended to sue her for harass-
ment.
However, the Jaspers’ delusion proper quoted in
DSM might be considered only homonymous of the
‘‘original’’ Jaspers’ delusion proper: Jaspers related
the ununderstandability to the ‘‘immediate intrusive
knowledge of the meaning’’ rather than simply to ‘‘.
thought processes that are so divorced from normal hu-
manexperience ..’’ Theexclusion criteria of‘‘primary’’
delusion adopted, eg, by the PSE
5 may be considered in-
compatible with the DSM example reported above: ‘‘.
Do not, of course, include delusions which are explan-
ations of other phenomena, such as thought insertion,
hallucinations, subcultural beliefs, etc., as most are
.’’ (p173).
The patient’s description above can be compared with
the following patient’s words reported by Jaspers
3 in
which the enigmatic experience is not completely inter-
mingled and ‘‘obscured’’ by the judgment about it.
. However precisely my thoughts are understood and how-
ever much entire sentences are shouted at me by the appa-
ratus, it is a fact that I know quite definitely that to a large
extent these are not my own thoughts and that is the great
puzzle . (p580).
Enigmatic, puzzling characteristics of experiences of
the disorder have been frequently described in the scien-
tific literature: Kraepelin
15 reports the ‘‘bewildered and
confused patients to whom everything appears changed,
incomprehensible and mysterious’’ (p48). The subjects
use words and sentences like infamous game (p56),
enchanted house (p112), mystery (p112), secret gossiping
(p117), something false in things (p118), puzzles (p169),
masked(p169),andsecret(p169)andformulatequestions
(ie, inwardly directed to the voices): . Why are you
speaking in me? . Why do you torment me? . What is
your real object? . Are you human beings or spirits? .
(p193-p194).
Similar words and sentences are described in Bleuler
16:
strange, different, (p68); Mc Ghie and Chapman
17: fright-
ening, unexpected; Cutting
18: frightening (pp259, 279),
unreal (p267), unexpected (p279); and Jaspers
3 himself:
amazing (p73), alien (pp86, 118), bewitched (pp100,
102), unnatural (pp100, 102), ambiguous (p100), uncanny
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(p118), extraordinary (p124), surprised (pp72, 77, 152),
riddle (p579), and puzzle (pp153, 580).
The terms reported above are hypothesized to repre-
sent the enigmatic connotations of the experiential sub-
strate of the disorder that may be suffered in any affected
function (thought, perception, mood, etc.) in schizophre-
nia. These enigmatic characteristics indicate that the
experiences of the disorder are unexpected, are received
suddenly,are‘‘self-giving,’’andhavefrequentlyabnormal,
strange, alien connotations for the patients themselves.
The Jaspers’ concept of ‘‘delusional experience/
delusion proper/primary delusion,’’ characterized by ‘‘in-
trusive knowledge of meaning’’ and by being ‘‘ununder-
standable,’’ has been loosely adopted to support different
and incompatible views of delusions. This concept is not
consideredworthy ofadoption in the approach presented
here. This concept and, in particular, the construct of the
‘‘phenomenologically final, psychologically irreducible,
beyond our understanding, delusional experience
(wahn-erleben) of meaning,’’ might collapse and inter-
mingleanumberofdifferentphenomena:(1)thepatient’s
enigmatic passive experience, (2) the patient’s acts of
judgment directed to understand/explain the enigmatic
passive experience, (3) the psychopathologist’s enigmatic
experience of the patient’s delusion, and (4) the psycho-
pathologist (not) understanding/explaining the patient’s
delusion.Therefore,thealien,enigmatic,notunderstand-
able patient’s delusional experience/delusion proper/pri-
mary delusion that is observed by the clinician (and is
beyond the clinician’s understanding) may simply mirror
the alien, enigmatic passive experience that irrupts in the
awareness of the patient (and that is beyond the patient’s
understanding).
For Jaspers,
3 the ‘‘enigmatic’’ was confined to the
researcher’s active, intentional, and voluntary reaching
the margin of a mode of knowing:
. Everything enigmatic therefore is a reminder to us to ac-
cept the failure of a particular mode of comprehension and
at the same time to search for some other mode whereby the
facts are no longer enigmatic to us but become a ground for
insight. Everything enigmatic always lies at the margins of
a particular mode of knowing . (p752).
and it is here hypothesized that the patients could pas-
sively, unintentionally, and involuntarily reach a similar
margin of their personal mode of knowing toward the
enigmatic passive experiences of the disorder. These pas-
sive experiences might be received persistently and might
continue to remain a puzzle for the patient over time, in
spite of his or her attempts aimed at ‘‘understanding’’ or
‘‘explaining’’ them.
In the descriptive approach presented here, any passive
experience of a disorder may be considered ‘‘beyond the
understanding of affected subjects,’’ similarly to any pas-
sive experience of any physical condition (eg, physical
pain). Acts of judgment formulation aimed at intention-
ally understanding or causally explaining passive experi-
ences are consequently not included in this definition of
passive experiences. They are here considered (active)
acts of the subject toward his/her own self-giving, possi-
bly alien and enigmatic passive experiences of the disor-
der. In this approach, the definition of ‘‘delusion’’
formulated toward the passive experiences should imply
that
(i) The act of judgment formulation is always at the
basis of the ‘‘delusional judgment’’ (the Jaspers’ term
‘‘delusional experience’’ is considered misleading in
this approach and excluded).
(ii) The judgment may be expressed in terms of belief
or doubt, conviction or no conviction, certainty,
or uncertainty.
(iii) The delusion stems from an ‘‘active,’’ intentional
processofjudgmentformulatedbythesubjecttoward
his own specific self-giving experiential substrate
(obviously, it does not exclude that the delusional
judgment formulation could be actively developed
in the absence of any specific passive experience).
(iv) The conviction/belief that characterizes the subject’s
delusion will be always the end-point ‘‘evidence’’ of
his or her active, intentional, process of judgment
formulation about passive experiences and it is not
to be confused with the ‘‘self-evidence’’ of the imme-
diate, self-giving, passive experiences of the disorder.
A New Measure to Assess the Experiential Substrate of
Schizophrenia
The Scale for the Assessment of Passively Received Expe-
riences (PRE) is a measure currently under development
by the author of this article. The PRE items focus on pas-
sive experiences of schizophrenia as an independent psy-
chopathological domain and as distinct from judgments
made to understand and explain the passive experiences.
This measure is radically different from other clinical
measures. The PRE includes several questions referring
to different passive experiences of thought insertion,
including
Do you ever have the feeling that thoughts that are not your
own are suddenly put in your head against your will?
This question explores the passive domain by identifying
and describing the specific passive experience and disen-
tangling it from the active acts of the process of judgment
formulation. These acts may be further examined by
a proper articulation of subsequent questions aimed at
analyzing the acts of the judgment formulation and at ex-
ploring and describing the architecture and the interac-
tions of the process from passive experience to
judgment (and delusion) and from judgment (and delu-
sion) back to passive experience. An individual
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rience
and this is hypothesized to be the specific, irreducible,
final, original passive experience, and subsequently
may or may not take this passive experience as the sub-
strate of a possible pathway of acts: he/she
  may or may not ‘‘take a position’’ about this original
passive experience;
  may or may not develop acts of judgment formulation
for understanding/explaining the passive experience in
terms of doubt or conviction, uncertainty, or certainty;
  may or may not develop delusional notions/ideas for
understanding/explaining this passive experience;
  may be doubtful or convinced, uncertain, or certain
about his/her delusional understanding/explaining of
this passive experience.
The individual may proceed in a possible pathway of
acts in the opposite direction, from the conviction about
his/her possible delusional understanding/explaining of
the passive experience to the original passive experience
itself and
  may or may not intentionally and actively return back
to the original passive experience;
  may or may not retake position toward the original
passive experience
and to use the original passive experience as a firm point
and ‘‘lever’’ to reformulate previous judgments aimed at
understanding/explaining the passive experience itself:
he/she
  may or may not reformulate alternative explanations
of the passive experience;
  may or may not compare his previous understanding/
explaining the passive experience (either delusional or
not) with a number of alternative possible options
aimed at understanding/explaining this passive
experience;
  mayor maynot recognize that other options for under-
standing/explaining the original passive experience (ei-
therdelusionalor not)maynotbeworse thanhis orher
previous act of understanding/explaining.
This process disentangles the original passive experi-
ence from acts of intentional judgment formulation
about the experience and also accounts for the relevant
opportunity to reconsider and critically evaluate both
the original experience and competing explanations of
it, criticism that may only be possible for the patient
through a return to the original passive experience.
The disorder may be characterized only by the passive
experience that the subject receives because he/she has
not yet proceeded along a chain of judgment formulation
about a specific passive experience, because he/she is un-
able to formulate such a judgment, simply because he/she
has not sufficient motive to formulate a judgment either
delusional or not toward the passive experience.
Interview questions focusing only on the passive expe-
riencemight be consideredsimilar tothe simplestmedical
exploration of the patient’s passive experience of physical
pain. The physician never asks: ‘‘Do you think, suspect,
doubt, postulate, notice, know, have the idea, are convinced
or believe you have pain here?’’ because the nature of the
simple, immediate, self-giving, passive experience of pain
is obvious. The patient might take an active position to-
ward his or her experience of pain, might search for
a meaning for it and/or formulate causal explanations,
but those phenomena are distinct from the immediate,
specific, independent, self-giving experience of pain,
which is well recognized as an independent domain
that needs to be consistently assessed.
Thought insertion is here defined as an immediate, self
giving, self-evident passive experience in the domain of
the experiential substrate of schizophrenia which irrupt
in the awareness of the subject similarly to the experience
of pain. This phenomenon is distinguished from the in-
tentional, active process of judgment formulation that
the subject may or may not develop toward this passive
experience, either aimed at understanding the meanings
of the experience or at explaining its causes. This judg-
ment may be formulated in terms of doubt or convic-
tion/belief and may or may not be delusional.
The passive domain is not considered in the criteria
(Andreasen
19) proposed for assigning a cutoff score for
symptomatic remission in schizophrenia, which suggests
that a symptom severity score of mild or less (Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale [PANSS] item scores of   3;
BriefPsychiatricRatingScaleitemscoresof 3,andScale
fortheAssessmentofPositiveSymptoms[SAPS]-Scalefor
theAssessmentofNegativeSymptoms[SANS]scores  3)
on all items as representative of an impairment level con-
sistent with symptomatic remission of the illness.
These symptomatic remission criteria have been con-
sidered to have clinical validity (Van Os et al
20) and to
be both sensitive and specific indicators of clinical status
(Opler et al
21).
However, if these operational criteria for defining symp-
tomatic remission in schizophrenia are applied, ie, to delu-
sions, as they are defined in the SAPS and the PANSS,
following the approach presented here, the key cutoff of
remission is simply limited to the transition through the
border ‘‘being convinced/questioning’’ about the delusion
(SAPS) and ‘‘tenaciously holding/not tenaciously holding’’
(PANSS) the delusion (the SAPS and the PANSS scales
will be examined in detail in the following section).
These criteria neglect a fundamental border that might
be particularly useful in the definition of transition to
remission: the border between (1) the possible passive
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which the judgment (or delusional judgment) is formu-
lated and (2) the possible judgment (or delusional judg-
ment) in terms of ‘‘questioning/not tenaciously holding’’
and being convinced/tenaciously holding toward the pas-
sive experience itself (ie, thought insertion).
Obviously, the fundamental assessment of the remis-
sion of the passive experience itself (ie, of thought inser-
tion) is also clearly neglected, an important omission
because these experiences may be independent symptoms
(indicators) of schizophrenia, may be persistent over
time, may be severely disturbing for the patient, and if
not specifically assessed, continue to be largely ignored
by research and care.
Experience,Judgment,andDelusioninSemistructuredand
Structured Clinical Interviews
Thesemistructuredandstructuredclinicalinterviewscur-
rently in use may be considered to share a basic, common
conceptual problem: the term experience is not techni-
cally, operationally defined; it is interchangeably used
with other terms; its passive nature is not considered
and it is confused with acts of judgment about the expe-
riences, actively formulated ideas, notions, and beliefs,
either delusional or not, held with either doubt or firm
conviction.
To furtherclarify the operationalized definitionof pas-
sive experiences presented above and illustrate how this
approach differs in practice from other approaches,
a number of well-known clinical measures are examined
in detail: Composite International Diagnostic Interview
(CIDI), Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
Axis 1 Disorders (SCID), SAPS, and PANSS.
Diagnostic Clinical Interviews
CompositeInternationalDiagnosticInterview. The CIDI
is a fully structured psychiatric diagnostic interview in
whichinterviewerjudgmentplaysnopartintheresponses.
Thisrespondent-basedinterview,frequentlyadministered
by lay interviewers, uses totally structured questions that
the respondent answers, often in a yes-no format.
The CIDI-1
22 question about thought insertion
Have you ever been convinced that strange thoughts, or
thoughts that were not your own, were being put directly
into your mind? .
collapses the passive experience with judgments in terms
of conviction about the experience.
TheCIDIhasbeen recentlyreformulatedbythe World
Mental Health (WMH) Survey Initiative Version of the
World Health Organization—CIDI (Kessler and
Ustun
23). The authors report that the previous CIDI ap-
proach was based on the assumption that ‘‘psychotics
would be more willing to admit their symptoms if these
phenomena were normalized’’:
. The standard version of the CIDI introduces the psycho-
sis questions with the statement: ‘‘Now I want to ask you
about some ideas you might have about other people .
The first question is ‘‘Have you ever believed people were
spying on you?’’ .... A great many people answer these
responses positively, the vast majority of whom give plausi-
ble answers. This is not surprising as the experiences asked
about are all quite common ....
The authors
23 noted that this approach generates an
enormous number of false positives that would compli-
cate the process of screening for psychosis and also in-
troduce the strong possibility of errors in classifying
false positives as cases based on open-ended responses.
They have reformulated radically the CIDI interview to
avoid these problems:
The philosophy behind the WMH-CIDI approach is the op-
posite: to make it clear to respondents that we are asking
about odd experiences; to motivate reporting with an intro-
duction that validates the experiences and points to the im-
portance of learning more about them; and beginning the
questioning with hallucinations rather than delusions in or-
der to reinforce the introductory remarks about the ques-
tions being about odd behaviours.
The CIDI-3.0 reformulation of the question referring to
thought insertion:
. The third thing is really two. One is believing that some
mysterious force was inserting many different strange
thoughts—that were definitely not your own thoughts—
directly into your head by means of x-rays or laser beams
or other methods. [The other is believing that your own
thoughts were being stolen out of your mind by some strange
force.] Did you ever have either of these mind control
experiences?
The authors’ aim of formulating a question indicating
sufficiently ‘‘odd experiences’’ to avoid false positives
through a single yes/no ‘‘totally structured question’’ is
reinforced by including in the question the indication/
suggestion of a causal explanation of thought insertion
(‘‘by means of x-rays or laser beams or other methods’’).
The term experiences is not technically defined by the
authors and it is interchangeably used with terms like
‘‘ideas’’ and ‘‘behaviors.’’ The authors do not specify if
they consider irreducible or reducible what is described
in this totally structured question that can be adminis-
tered by lay interviewers.
If what CIDI-3.0 describes is not irreducible, as is
hypothesized here, this formulation could confuse and
collapse(1)thepassiveexperiencewith(2)theactofjudg-
ment formulation in terms of belief about the passive
experience and with (3) the act of judgment formula-
tion in terms of belief about the causal explanation of
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instruments to put in practice the intention of control).
Future CIDI revisions may benefit from reformulating
questions that link experiences to delusional causal
explanations. The interviewer should (1) first assess inde-
pendently the experiential substrate of the disorder and
(2) only subsequently attempt to identify the complex
‘‘architecture’’ of the possible process of delusional judg-
ment formulation about the experiences themselves, us-
ing a number of appropriately designed, step-by-step
questions to prevent a collapsed question from inducing
a collapsed answer. Lay interviewers might not be ideal
for these step-by-step types of questions.
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 1
Disorders. The SCID-I
24 is a semistructured interview
for making the major DSM-IV Axis 1 diagnoses. It is ad-
ministered by a clinician or trained mental health profes-
sionalwhoisfamiliarwiththeDSM-IVclassificationand
diagnostic criteria. The SCID-I does not have a specific
sectionaimedatdefining,evaluating,andscalingthought
insertion as a specific symptom. The user’s guide refers to
thought insertion only in the context of ‘‘delusions of be-
ing controlled’’ in which
Feelings, impulses, thoughts or actions are experienced as
being under the control of some external force.
The clinical interview employs the following question:
Did you ever feel that someone or something outside your-
self was controlling your thoughts or actions against your
will?
This is followed by the question specifically focusing on
thought insertion
Did you ever feel that certain thoughts that were not your
ownwereputintoyourhead?(Whatabouttakenoutofyour
head?)
Even though the specific questions focus on the respond-
ent’s ‘‘feeling,’’ the experiential substrate of the disorder
is not independently defined, described, evaluated, or
scaled by the SCID. The SCID focuses the rating only
on the differentiation between ‘‘overvalued idea’’ and de-
lusion, while the assessment of the experiential substrate
is omitted: in rating each type of delusion the interviewer
must differentiate a delusion (which warrant a rating of
3=thresholdor true) from a strongly heldovervalued idea
(whichwarrantaratingof2=subthreshold).DSM-IV-TR
definition of overvalued idea
6
An unreasonable and sustained belief that is maintained
with less than delusional intensity (i.e. the person is able
to acknowledge the possibility that the belief may not be
true (p826).
ignores the description of the independent domain of the
experiential substrate of the disorder.
ThoughtinsertionisnotconsideredbySCID-Itobean
independent symptom (indicator) with an independent
score: it is to be simply checked by the rater as a feature
of the symptom (indicator) delusion of being controlled.
The rational for this decision is not provided. If thought
insertion is not simply a feature of the delusion of being
controlled, but an independent passive experience and
a possible independent symptom (indicator), as hypoth-
esized here, the procedure of first interviewing the subject
about the delusion of being controlled and then checking
about thought insertion might insubstantially suggest to
the patient that the external control is acknowledged by
the interviewer as ‘‘cause’’ of what is received by the sub-
ject as a passive experience of thought insertion. If, as
here hypothesized, the passive experience of thought in-
sertion is an independent symptom of schizophrenia, this
interview procedure could be source of confusion for the
patient.
Future SCID-I revisions may benefit from reformulat-
ing questions and administration procedures that assess
thought insertion and the delusion of being controlled.
The interviewer should first focus on the assessment of
thepassive experienceof thoughtinsertion asanindepen-
dent symptom and separately assess the delusion of being
controlled as a different symptom, using carefully
designed step-by-step questions.
Scales for Symptoms Assessment
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms. The
SAPS (Andreasen
25) is designed to assess positive symp-
toms, principally those that occur in schizophrenia. It is
intended to serve as a complementary instrument to the
SANS.
In the SAPS thought insertion is defined:
The subject believes that thoughts that are not his own have
been inserted into his mind. For example, the subject may
believe that a neighbor is practicing voodoo and planting
alien sexual thoughts in his mind. This symptom should
not be confused with experiencing unpleasant thoughts
that the subject recognizes as his own, such as delusions
of persecution or guilt.
The related questions are
Have you ever felt that thoughts were being put into your
head by some outside force? Have you ever experienced
thoughts that didn’t seem to be your own?
The SAPS scales thought insertion as follows:
  0—None.
  1—Questionable.
  2—Mild: Subject has experienced thought insertion, but
doubts it occasionally.
  3—Moderate: Clear experience of thought insertion,
which occurred on two or three occasions in a week.
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which occurs frequently; behavior may be affected.
  5—Severe: Clear experience of thought insertion which
occurs frequently, pervades the subject’s life, and affect
behavior.
The SAPS describes and scales judgments in terms of
doubt/no doubt and does not describe what is considered
here the independent domain of the passive experience of
thought insertion. Thought insertion is reported by the
SAPS as ‘‘experienced’’; however no technical definition
of the experience is provided, and the relationship be-
tween experience and delusion is not operationalized.
The SAPS Global Rating of Severity of Delusions, de-
fined ‘‘. false beliefs that cannot be explained on the ba-
sis of the subject’s cultural background . ’’ is based on
‘‘. duration and persistence of delusions, the extent of
the subject’s preoccupation with the delusions, his degree
of conviction, and their effect on his actions . the extent
to which the delusions might be considered bizarre or
unusual ..’’
  0—None.
  1—Questionable.
  2—Mild: Delusion definitely present but, at times, the
subject questions the belief.
  3—Moderate: The subject is convinced of the belief, but
it may occur infrequently and have little effect on his
behavior.
  4—Marked: The delusion is firmly held; it occurs fre-
quently and affects the subject’s behavior.
  5—Severe: Delusions are complex, well formed, and per-
vasive;theyarefirmlyheldandhaveamajoreffectonthe
subject’s behavior; they may be somewhat bizarre or
unusual.
Thus, the SAPS does not define or assess the experien-
tial substrate of schizophrenia separately from acts of
judgment. Instead, it intermingles thought insertion
with ‘‘false’’ belief.
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. The PANSS
26
is a semistructured clinical interview ‘‘conceived as an
operationalized, drug-sensitive instrument that provides
balancedrepresentationofpositiveandnegativesymptoms
and gauges their relationships to one another and to global
psychopathology.’’ It is frequently used for the evaluation
of treatment response in schizophrenia. Thought insertion
is not specifically assessed in the PANSS’ delusions. In the
PANSS, delusions are defined as ‘‘beliefs that are un-
founded, unrealistic, and idiosyncratic.’’
The PANSS uses the following scale to rate delusions.
1—Absent: Definition does not apply.
2—Minimal: Questionable pathology; the patient may be
at the upper extreme of normal limits.
3—Mild: Presence of 1 or 2 delusions that are vague, un-
crystallized, and not tenaciously held. The delusions do
not interfere with the patient’s thinking, social relation,
or behavior.
4—Moderate: Presence of either a kaleidoscopic array of
poorly formed, unstable delusions, or a few well-formed
delusions that occasionally interfere with the patient’s
thinking, social relations, or behavior.
5—Moderate-severe: Presence of numerous well-formed
delusions that are tenaciously held and occasionally
interfere with the patient’s thinking, social relations,
or behavior.
6—Severe: Presence of a stable set of delusions that are
crystallized, possibly systematized, tenaciously held,
and clearly interfere with the patient’s thinking, social
relations, and behavior.
7—Extreme: Presence of a stable set of delusions that are
eitherhighlysystematizedorverynumerousanddominate
majorfacetsofthepatient’slife.Thisbehaviorfrequently
resultsininappropriateandirresponsibleactionthatmay
even jeopardize the safety of the patient or others.
The experiential substrate of the disorder is not de-
fined, described, or evaluated in the PANSS scaling of
delusions. Similarly to the other measures discussed
above, the PANSS describes and scales acts of judgment
formulation in the key modalities of tenaciously held/not
tenaciously held, ‘‘stability/unstability,’’ ‘‘systematiza-
tion/not systematization,’’ and ‘‘crystalization/not crys-
talization.’’ The PANSS ignores/omits the assessment
of the treatment response of what is considered here
the independent domain of the experiential substrate
of the disorder and the possible subjective disturbance
that the passive experiences (ie, thought insertion) may
directly cause to the patient over time.
Effectiveness, Subjective Usefulness, and Adherence to
Treatment
The experiential substrate and the passive experiences
of schizophrenia may have a significant role in the assess-
ment of the efficacy and effectiveness of treatments for
schizophrenia. Many passive experiences of schizophrenia
are reported by subjects as severely and immediately dis-
turbing in themselves, and the assessment of this domain
may provide a potentially valuable extension of current
methods for evaluating clinical outcomes and treatment
impact and for informing research and development of
new treatments and new drugs for schizophrenia.
The main strategy for drug development has been to
target positive psychotic symptoms (hallucinations, delu-
sions, and disorganization) and hope that antipsychotic
efficacy will extend to other aspects of schizophrenia, in-
cluding negative symptoms. The relative lack of success
in developing pharmacological treatments for negative
symptoms points to the insufficiency of this strategy
1192
M. Moscarelliand raises questions about the assumption of a common
neuropsychopharmacology (Kirkpatrick et al
27).
Recentconclusionsabouttheefficacyandeffectiveness
of antipsychotic medications from the Clinical Antipsy-
chotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness (CATIE) (Lie-
berman et al
28) relied on time to discontinuation of
medication for any reason—a side effect, poor efficacy,
or the patient’s decision about adherence—as the princi-
pal outcome variable. A single clinical rating of symp-
toms, The PANSS was evaluated as a secondary
outcome. In all, 75% of 1493 patients with schizophrenia,
recruited at 57 US sites and randomly assigned to receive
conventional and atypical antipsychotics, stopped taking
their first medication before the end of the 18-month
study. The opportunity to switch to another antipsy-
chotic only marginally reduced the 75% global discontin-
uation before the end of 18 months. The CATIE results
were considered discouraging because they demonstrated
that treating schizophrenia, even with newer, second gen-
eration drugs, is only partially effective and is associated
with problematic side effects (Freedman
29).
The focus on positive psychotic symptoms of schizo-
phrenia is likely due to the relevance they have in the cur-
rent diagnostic practice on the basis of their supposed
roots in the history of psychiatry:
. Those patients who qualify by virtue of having delusions
and hallucinations manifests the most typically Kraepeli-
nian form of the disorder . (DSM-IV-TR Guide-
book
30(p163)).
. Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions
are bizarre . (DSM-IV-TR
6(p312)).
However, Kraepelin
15 did not consider ‘‘delusions and
hallucinations’’ as the most typical form of ‘‘dementia
praecox’’:
. unfortunately there is in the domain of psychic disorders
no singlemorbid symptom whichisthoroughlycharacteristic
of a definite malady (p257) . In the controversy about the
significance of isolated morbid symptoms. the frequently
employed conception of ‘‘catatonic’’ phenomena embraces
a number of characteristics which are only in the smallest
part specially peculiar to catatonia.A more or less convinc-
ing proof is given by their accumulation and their connection
with yet other disorders in themselves likewise not character-
istic, as hallucinations, delusions of influence on will . As
already mentioned genuine negativism, instinctive, purely
passive resistance, seems to me to posses the relatively great-
est significance as an isolated symptom . (p261).
and the ‘‘bizarre ununderstandable Schneiderian delu-
sion’’ previously examined might be better described,
as it is here proposed, by the interaction of passive expe-
rience and the acts of judgment toward the passive expe-
rience, suggesting that even the narrowest definition of
‘‘psychotic’’ reported in DSM-IV-TR
6:
.Thenarrowestdefinitionofpsychoticisrestrictedtodelu-
sions or prominent hallucinations, with the hallucinations
occurring in the absence of insight into their pathological
nature . (p827).
might not be sufficiently narrow because it might col-
lapse, eg, the passive experience of thought insertion
andtheactivejudgmenttowardthisexperience(eitherde-
lusional or not, either formulated in terms of doubt or
conviction/belief), domains that might be different and
heterogeneous.
The centrality of delusions and hallucinations (mainly
defined and scaled on the basis of the conviction about
false beliefs of delusions and of the conviction about
the reality of hallucinations) may have resulted in a vi-
cious circle in which the effects of ‘‘antipsychotics’’
may influence the ‘‘narrowest’’ definition of psychosis
and the narrowest definition of psychosis may influence
new drug discovery and development. This possible ‘‘vi-
cious circle’’ may have precluded the extension of the as-
sessment of medications’ impact to the experiential
substrateofthedisorderandtothesubjectivedisturbance
resulting from individual passive experiences of the dis-
order. The failure to assess passive experiences and the
disturbance they cause has implications for future drug
discovery and drug development and also for other
aspects of schizophrenia. The National Institute of Men-
tal Health (NIMH) consensus statement on treatments in
the areaof negativesymptoms of schizophreniaacknowl-
edged the omission of the assessment of the experience of
emotion reported by the subject, as opposed to the ‘‘ob-
jective signs’’ of blunted affect:
. Some factor analyses suggest that the domains proposed
by the NIMH group are incomplete, and that the inclusion
of other relevant domains may be beneficial when character-
izing negative symptoms. Emotional experience is one area
that has not been completely addressed . (Alphs
31). . A
decrease in emotionality—the subjective experience of emo-
tion, as opposed to the objective ‘‘signs’’ of blunted affect—
may be an important omission from the domains addressed
by the Consensus Statement. However, as should be clear
from the Consensus Statement, the conference participants
did not intend to present their list of subdomains of negative
symptoms as the final word (Kirkpatrick
32).
In assessment of the impact of pharmaceutical inter-
ventions, the experiential substrate and the passive expe-
riences in schizophrenia might be considered comparable
to the nonspecific subjective symptom of pain associated
with a variety of medical conditions. Most drugs, includ-
ing all psychiatric drugs, are approved based on their rec-
ognized impact on specific diseases or syndromes. For
example, multiple ‘‘antipsychotic’’ drugs are approved
for the treatment of schizophrenia. However, other drugs
are approved based on their impact on nonspecific symp-
toms such as pain (Laughren and Levin
33):
. A third type of claim that the FDA will consider is for
a non-specific symptom, that is one that is not limited to
1193
Passive and Active Schizophreniaa single disease entity. The non-specific symptoms pain and
fever are examples of this third type of claim ..
If we examine the consensus on the recommended
measures to assess core outcome measures for pain clin-
ical trials (Dworkin et al
34),
. There are various aspects of pain that can change as a re-
sult of treatment, and the results of reviews of the literature
on pain assessment in adults support the recommendation
that measures of pain intensity, the use of rescue treatments,
pain quality and the temporal components of pain should be
considered when assessing pain outcomes. Self-report meas-
ures provide the ‘‘gold standard’’ in assessing pain outcomes
because they reflect the inherently subjective nature of pain,
but they should be supplemented by careful assessment of
the use of rescue treatments. Depending on the specific
objectives of the clinical trial, other approaches to assessing
pain can be considered, for example, overt expressions of
pain and distress (‘‘pain behaviors’’) ..
theemphasisgiventooutcomemeasuresoftheinherently
subjective nature of pain might be seen as a clear recog-
nition (gold standard) of the experiential substrate of
pain as a fundamental target for drug research and
development.
The consensus on recommended measures for clinical
trials related to pain cited above is in marked contrast to
the neglect of the assessment of the experiential substrate
and the passive experiences of schizophrenia. The poten-
tial benefit of treatment’s impact on passive experiences
(ie, the specific impact on the passive experience of
thought insertion itself and its possible subjective distur-
bance) will be missed if the assessment of treatment effi-
cacy and effectiveness in schizophrenia does not include
these experiences as a treatment target.
Treatments that minimize the immediate and specific
passive experiences of the disorder and their often dis-
turbing effects may be subjectively acknowledged by
the patients as more personally useful than treatments
that minimize ‘‘objectively’’ assessed symptoms, avoid
future relapses, or control socially problematic behav-
iors. This personal value to patients would contrast
with indications that have accumulated over time which
suggest that treatment is principally aimed at solving the
problems of persons other than the patient.
Treatment has been seen as solving the problem of
society
35
.Publicasylumsformanicshavebeenregardedasplacesof
confinement for such of its members as are become danger-
ous to the peace of society . (Pinel
35(p3)).
and the problems of the family:
16
. It is not often that the fundamental symptoms are so
markedly exhibited as to cause the patient to be hospitalized
in a mental institution. It is primarily the accessory phenom-
ena [i.e delusions, hallucinations. Note of the Author] which
make his retention at home impossible, or it is they which
make the psychosis manifest and give occasion to require
psychiatric help . (Bleuler
16(p94)).
Ignoring the assessment and the development of treat-
ments focused on symptoms that might be considered
directly and personally disturbing for the patients may
contribute to treatment nonadherence in schizophrenia
and may contribute to the burden of the disorder on
patients, families, and society.
Conclusion
The experiential substrate of schizophrenia has long been
neglected, although it belongs to the fundamentals of psy-
chopathology and clinical practice. Modern diagnostic
tools and assessment approaches adopted the descriptive
approach in psychopathology in ways that may signifi-
cantly limit the power of current diagnostic tools and out-
comemeasuresinresearchandcare.Clinicalinterviewsthat
intermingle and confuse, according to the approach pre-
sented here, the passive experiences and the judgment
formulated by the patient toward the passive experiences
themselves may offer interviewed patients a potentially
misleading model of some relevant symptoms of schizo-
phrenia, model that might not have neutral effects on
the patients affected by the disorder, and that research
m a yn e e dt ot e s t .
The definition of passive experiences provides the basis
for the development of appropriate measures focused on
the passive domain of schizophrenia as an independent
domain of the disorder. Such measures have the potential
to be an important outcome component of clinical trials
evaluating the efficacy and effectiveness of treatments for
schizophrenia. They could provide valuable information
to pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical research and
development in schizophrenia on the experiential sub-
strate of the disorder, on the subjective disturbance it di-
rectly causes to the patient, on the treatment effects on
the passive experiences, and on the personal usefulness
of treatment and its impact on adherence to care.
Assessment of the passive experiences of schizophrenia
also has the potential to improvethe qualityof care at the
level of the individual patient and clinician. It can enable
the reformulation of clinical interview procedures, and
the ongoing patient/clinician discussion of the course
and outcome of a patient’s passive experiences, including
their subjective disturbance, may usefully facilitate in-
formed collaborative decision making about medication
regimens and other nonpharmacological interventions.
Psychopathology clearly needs new measures focusing
on the experiential substrate of schizophrenia for the as-
sessment of interventions aimed at prevention, care, and
rehabilitation in schizophrenia. A new measure focusing
on the high definition description of the passive experi-
ences in schizophrenia (PRE—http://www.preinstitute.
org) and on the disturbance they cause to patients has
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United States and internationally in several environ-
ments. Researchers and clinicians interested in this re-
search field and willing to participate as collaborating
sites to the evaluation process of the PRE and to the as-
sessment of the experiential substrate of schizophrenia
are invited to contact the author.
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